Preparatory Memo for India

Your team will represent India in the negotiations surrounding the UN Security Council. Therefore, your team will have one vote but no veto on the Council. You should focus on Indian values and interests as you prepare for the simulation. This memo aims to help orient and kick-start your team’s background research.

Overview of Bilateral Relations

India and Iran have a long history of engagement based on their geographic proximity. During the Cold War, India and Iran were politically and ideologically opposed (with the Shah an American ally and India tilting toward the Soviet Union and leading the Non-Aligned Movement.) After the 1979 revolution, India and Iran maintained modest ties, though Tehran had more affinity with Islamic Pakistan than secular India. The two countries have built a broadly positive relationship since the end of the Cold War, based much more on shared interests than ideological affinity. Nevertheless, relations have come under strain over the nuclear program and Indo-Israeli ties.

India’s Priorities in Iran

• **Economic** – The Indian government’s main interests in Iran are economic. Annual two-way bilateral trade has risen from negligible levels early in the post-Cold War period to over $14 billion today, mostly in the oil and gas sector. India’s rapid economic growth has given rise to an acute need for oil, gas, and other natural resources. However, India’s mortal foe—Pakistan—lies between India and the energy-rich states of Central Asia. India and Iran have long discussed the possibility of a pipeline that would help India reduce reliance on pipelines and transport corridors going through Pakistan.

• **Military/Strategic** – India and Iran share certain common strategic priorities, most notably in Afghanistan. Both countries border Pakistan and have tense relations with Islamabad. Both India and Iran have generally opposed the Taliban (which receives backing from Pakistan). Iran has done so to pursue greater influence in Afghanistan and protect Shi’a Muslims in the country, who suffered badly under Taliban rule. India opposes the Taliban to reduce the space for terrorist sanctuaries and to deny Pakistan the strategic depth that flows from having allies in Afghanistan. Considerable tension nevertheless exists. Although its current position is ambiguous, India has in the past opposed the Iranian nuclear program under pressure from the United States and other Western powers. In particular, India voted against Iran at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 2005 during Indo-U.S. negotiations for a civil-nuclear agreement. Tehran and New Delhi also spar over India’s ties with Israel, whom India has long considered an important partner for arms procurement and counter-terrorism cooperation.

• **Diplomatic** – India has followed a balancing act in the diplomacy surrounding Iran and the nuclear program. On the one hand, India has long been a staunch champion of countries’ right to develop peaceful civilian nuclear energy. (India was subject to various sanctions for many years as a result of its nuclear program.) On the other hand, India is under considerable pressure from Western capitals to press for tougher sanctions against Iran. After decades of Cold War estrangement from the United States, India has achieved rapprochement with America in the past decade, which has
helped New Delhi achieve recognition as a legitimate nuclear power and facilitated defense ties that India seeks to balance a rising China. India’s ties to Iran are a significant ongoing irritant in Indo-U.S. relations. India’s diplomatic position going forward is uncertain.

- **Ideological** – India and Iran have little in common domestically. However, they occasionally find common cause in foreign affairs. Both countries regard themselves as important bulwarks against Western imperialism, although India now has relatively positive relations with the Western powers and Iran’s relations with the West are generally acrimonious.

- **Humanitarian & Environmental** – India stands to lose from any environmental disaster in the Persian Gulf. Its economy depends somewhat on Gulf oil. India also has a large number of guest workers employed in the Persian Gulf and would likely need to attend to their safety in the event of a major disaster.

**India and the UN Security Council**

India is not a permanent member of the UN Security Council but is one of the “G-4” countries along with Japan, Brazil, and Germany seeking a permanent seat. India has traditionally felt unduly excluded from the inner circle of great powers at the Security Council and has advocated strenuously for a greater role. India has a proud tradition as an anti-imperial vanguard and has long stressed the merits of multilateral diplomacy in restraining great-power hegemony. Thus, despite having a relatively liberal democratic system at home, India often defends norms of state sovereignty and non-interference at the United Nations. It also defends poor-country interests and has been one of the most strident defenders of the Global South in the General Assembly. For both reasons, it commonly votes with developing states such as China against the major Western powers.

**Key Questions**

As you conduct your background research for the IPE, you should be thinking about the types of choices India might need to make in an Iranian crisis related to the nuclear program. Key questions include:

- What are India’s key interests in connection with Iran’s nuclear program?
- Under what conditions would India support additional sanctions against Iran through the UN Security Council?
- Under what conditions, if any, would India be apt to favor military intervention?
- In the event of a humanitarian or environmental disaster, what types of contingencies would be of greatest concern to the Indian government?

During our pre-IPE sessions in November, we will ask your team to answer some of these questions aloud. You should come prepared with one-minute answers to each question. One purpose of this exercise is to motivate you to prepare—which will make the IPE more interesting and useful to you. A second purpose is to inform the other teams of the types of positions you are likely to take, which can help them come prepared as well.

**A Few Readings**

Below are a few recent readings to help you get started. These are not meant to be at all exhaustive; you will need to undertake additional research to prepare for the simulation.

- Anna Newby, “India-Iran-U.S. Relations,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, Aug. 11, 2010
  [http://csis.org/blog/india-iran-us-relations](http://csis.org/blog/india-iran-us-relations)
• Sreeram Chaulia, “India and Iran in the Obama Era,” *The Globalist*, Feb. 2010
  [http://www.sreeramchaulia.net/India-Iran.pdf](http://www.sreeramchaulia.net/India-Iran.pdf)

• Raja Karthikeya, “India’s Iran Calculus,” *Foreign Policy*, Sept. 24, 2010