

**Author(s):** Rahul Sami, 2009

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**Lecture 12:**

**Explanations; Scalable**

**Implementation; Manipulation**

**SI583: Recommender Systems**



# Explanations in recommender systems

- Moving away from the black-box oracle model
- *justify* why a certain item is recommended
- maybe also *converse* to reach a recommendation




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1.



### [Auction Theory](#)

by Vijay Krishna

Average Customer Review: ★★★★★

In Stock

Publication Date: March 1, 2002

**Our Price: \$52.46** [Used & new](#) from \$52.46

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Recommended because you purchased [Putting Auction Theory to Work](#) and more ([edit](#))

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
Amazon.com



# Amazon explanations (contd.)

amazon.com

## Recommended for You



**Algorithmic Game Theory**  
by Noam Nisan (Editor), et al.  
**Our Price: \$33.75**  
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x | ☆☆☆☆☆

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## Because you purchased...

**Prediction, Learning, and Games** (Hardcover)  
by Nicolo Cesa-Bianchi (Author), Gabor Lugosi (Author)

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# Why have explanations? [Tintarev & Masthoff]

- Transparency
- “Scrutability”: correct errors in learnt preference model
- Trust/Confidence in system
- Effectiveness & efficiency(speed)
- Satisfaction/enjoyment



# Example: explanations for transparency and confidence


- “Movie X was recommended to you because it is similar to movie Y, Z that you recently watched”
- “Movie X was recommended to you because you liked other comedies”
- “Other users who bought book X also bought book Y”





# Generating explanations

- Essentially, explain the steps of the CF algorithm, picking the most prominent “neighbors”
  - User-user
  - Item-item
- Harder to do for SVD and other abstract model-fitting recommender algorithms



# Conversational recommenders

Example transcript: (from [McSherry, “Explanation in Recommender Systems, AI Review 2005]):

- *Top case*: please enter your query
- *User*: Type = wandering, month = aug
- *Top Case*: the target case is “aug, tyrol, ...”  
other competing cases include “....”
- *Top case*: What is the preferred location?
- *User*: why?
- *Top case*: It will help eliminate ... alternatives
- *User*: alps..



# Conversational recommenders

- One view: CF using some navigational data as well as ratings
- More structured approach: incremental collaborative filtering
  - similarity metric changes as the query is refined
- e.g., incremental Nearest-Neighbor algorithm [McSherry, AI Review 2005]



# Scalable Implementations

- Learning objective:
  - see some techniques that are used for large-scale recommenders
  - Know where to start looking for more information



# Google News Personalization

[Das et al, WWW'07] describe algo. and arch.

- Specific challenges: News
  - relevant items are frequently changing
  - users long-lived, but often new users
  - Very fast response times needed
- Specific challenges: Google
  - scale! many items, many many users
  - need to parallelize complex computations



# Algorithms

- Input data: clicks
  - eg, “user J clicked on article X”
- Use a combination of three reco algos:
  - user-user (with a simple similarity measure)
  - SVD (“PLSI”)
  - Item-item (mainly for new users; simple covisitation similarity measure)




# Tricks / approximations for scalable computing

- User-user: calculate weighted avg. over only a *cluster* of users
  - J and K in same cluster if they have a high fraction of overlapped clicks
  - clustering is precomputed offline (using a fast MinHash algorithm)
- SVD : Precompute user-side weights; update only item-side weights in real time
  - gives an approximate SVD
- Tweak offline algorithms for parallel computing on Google's map-reduce infrastructure



# Architecture (from Das et al)




© PD-INEL Das et al.





# Experiences with the Netflix prize challenge

- Difference: static dataset
  
- My “architecture” (such as it was):
  - A clustered user-user
    - randomly chosen clusters (not optimal)
    - cluster size to fit user-user calc in 1GB memory
  - Preprocess, create indices (perl scripts)
  - Calculate similarities (in C) ***{memory bottleneck}***
  - Generate predictions (perl)
  - Evaluate accuracy on test set (perl)



# Manipulation..



# Why manipulate a recommender?

- Examples?



# Why manipulate a recommender?

## ■ Examples?

- Digg/Slashdot: get an article read
- PageRank: get your site high on results page
- Books: Author wants his book recommended
- Spam

## ■ How?



# Example: User-User Algorithm

user	item	A	B	C	...			X		
Joe		7	4		4	2		5		?
Sue		7	5	6	5			6		8
John		2		3		7				2

- $i$ 's informativeness score = correlation coefficient of  $i$ 's past ratings with Joe's past ratings
- Prediction for item X = average of ratings of X, weighted by the rater's scores



# Cloning Attack: Strategic copying

- Attacker may copy past ratings to look informative, gain influence.

Joe	7	4		4	2		5		?
FreeMeds	7	4		4	2		5		10

- Even if ratings are not directly visible, attacker may be able to infer something about ratings from her own recommendations, publicly available statistics
- Worse if many accounts can be created (sybil attack)



# One approach: profile analysis

- This problem of “shilling attacks” has been noted earlier [Lam and Riedl] [O’Mahoney et al]
- Many papers on empirical measurements and statistical detection of attack profiles
- Problem: attackers may get better at disguising their profiles.



# Results we *cannot* achieve

- Prevent any person J from manipulating the prediction on a single item X.
  - Cannot distinguish *deliberate manipulation* from *different tastes* on item X
- “Fairness”, ie., two raters with identical information get exactly the same influence, regardless of rating order.
  - Cannot distinguish second rater with identical information from an informationless clone.






# The influence limiter: Key Ideas

[Resnick and Sami, Proceedings of RecSys '07 conference]


- Limit *influence* until rater demonstrates *informativeness*
- *Informative* only if you're the first to provide the information




# Predictions on an Item: A Dynamic View




# Predictions on an Item: A Dynamic View





# Predictions on an Item: A Dynamic View



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


# Predictions on an Item: A Dynamic View



# Our approach

- Information-theoretic measure of contribution and damage
- Limit *influence* a rater can have had based on past *contribution*
- This limits *net damage* an attacker can cause



# Our Model

- Binary rating system (HIGH/LOW)
- Recommendations for a single target person
- Any recommender algorithm
- Powerful attackers:
  - Can create up to  $n$  sybil identities
  - Can “clone” existing rating profiles
- No assumptions on non-attackers:
  - Attacker’s sybils may form majority
  - Do not *depend* on honest raters countering attacks







# Overview of Results

“Influence-limiter” algorithm can be overlaid on any recommender algorithm to satisfy (with caveats):


- **Limited damage:** An attacker with up to  $n$  sybils can never cause net total damage greater than  $O(1)$  units of prediction error
- **Bounded information loss:** In expectation,  $O(\log n)$  units of information discarded from each genuine rater in total.



# Influence Limiter: Architecture




# Influence Limiter Algorithm: Illustration



# Influence Limiter Algorithm: Illustration

A rater with  $R=0.25$  puts in a rating



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A rater with  $R=0.25$  puts in a rating

